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Scherer: FIGHTING FOR THE CITY

WILLIAM E. NELSON, FIGHTING FOR THE CITY:
A HISTORY OF THE NEW YORK CITY CORPORATION
COUNSEL

Reviewed by Douglas D. Scherer*
Professor Nelson's excellent historical book on the New York
City Corporation Counsel focuses on the work of public officials who
served as legal advisors and advocated for the City of New York
from the founding of the City in 1686 through the end of the administration of Mayor David Dinkins on December 31, 1993. The book
provides limited discussion of Corporation Counsels under the subsequent administrations of Mayors Giuliani and Bloomberg, from 1994
through 2006.
When New York City was chartered as a municipality in
1686, the original charter provided for a person to serve as Recorder,
performing the functions of city judge, attorney, and record keeper.
From 1686 until the end of the eighteenth century, the Recorder was
a politically powerful advisor to the Common Council, the City's
governing body, and played an active role as a judge. For example,
Recorder Daniel Horsmanden presided at the trial of those accused of
participating in the 1741 Slave Conspiracy.1 At the end of the vari. Professor of Law, Touro Law Center; B.A., Case Western Reserve University; J.D., Suffolk University Law School; L.L.M., Harvard Law School.
1 WILLIAM E. NELSON, FIGHTING FOR THE CITY: A HISTORY OF THE NEW YORK CITY
CORPORATION COUNSEL

7-10 (2008).
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ous trials, Horsmanden had sentenced thirteen African Americans to
be burned at the stake, seventeen African Americans to be hanged,
four whites to be hanged, and eighty-six people to be exiled from the
colony. 2 With respect to the Recorder's non-judicial role, Professor
Nelson noted: "By the middle of the eighteenth century, in short, Recorders who served as legal advisors to the Mayor and Council already were shouldering the main tasks performed by the Law De3
partment today.",

The book discusses the careers and contributions of eighteenth and nineteenth century Corporation Counsels, and the interplay
between mayoral politics and legal representation by the Corporation
Counsels of the City. For example, corruption in the Office of the
Corporation Counsel developed in tandem with corruption among
Tammany Hall politicians, which contrasted with high standards for
lawyer competence, ethical behavior, and independence from politics
during other periods of time.4
A major event occurred in 1875 when William C. Whitney
was named Corporation Counsel.

Whitney served until 1882 and

created a City Law Department with highly competent lawyers and a
modem law firm operational structure.5 He hired lawyers from elite
law schools, eliminated reliance upon outside counsel, and required
City department heads to obtain advice and representation from the
City Law Department.6 He was able to operate with independence
2 Id.

at 10-11.

3 Id. at 21.
4 See id. at 134-38.
' Id. at 69.
6 NELSON, supra note 1, at 71.
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from other City departments in his representation of the City, and this
gave him control over the legal work done for the City.7
Whitney resigned in 1882 and was succeeded by Corporation
Counsels who continued his approach, including William H. Clark,
an 1889 Tammany Hall appointee. 8 In 1895, however, a new Corporation Counsel, Francis M. Scott, "brought politics back to the Law
Department." 9 By then, the Law Department "was the largest and
busiest law office in the nation."' 0 The responsibilities of the office
expanded with an increase in litigation and more frequent legal advice being given to City officials."
For twenty years after consolidation of the Bronx, Brooklyn,
Queens, Staten Island, and Manhattan in 1898, the Law Department
operated largely unchanged despite mayoral changes, but with an increasing number of attorneys hired on the basis of political patronage.' 2 This opened the door to success for large numbers of lawyers
who did not come from families with wealth and social status. As
described by Professor Nelson: "Tammany Hall, in sum, used the
Law Department to provide upward socio-economic mobility to its
brightest workers."' 3 He elaborated on this as follows:
We should hesitate about taking at face value the
claim of turn-of-the-century reformers that they hired
all "the best men." Admissions standards for the elite
Id. at 72.
s Id. at 74, 79.
9 Id. at 80.
10 Id.

1 NELSON, supra note 1, at 80. The Department, by 1897, "had thirty-eight lawyers and
seventy-seven clerical employees" and worked on 3,320 lawsuits. Id.
12 Id. at 97.
"3Id. at 109.
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schools from which reformers hired entry-level attorneys were not based on merit, but on lineage and
wealth. Many able youths, who were excluded from
the Ivy League and comparable schools, had to claw
their way up through institutions like Tammany Hall.
While graduates of elite schools probably had superior
educational experiences, many of the young men
whom Tammany brought into the Law Department
possessed real talent and were fully capable of performing the city's legal work
despite their lack of elite
4
educational credentials.'
This reflected the future trend of hiring from elite law
schools, combined with the hiring of top students with law review
experience from non-elite law schools. Professor Nelson recognized
this in the following: "Thus, what the twenty-year battle between
Tammany and the Fusion movement ultimately accomplished was to
provide the Law Department with skillful lawyers from both elite and
15
less influential schools."'
At the beginning of the twentieth century, the Law Department played a crucial role in providing legal advice that enabled the
"construction of the City's infrastructure."' 16 It also supported economic regulation of business and taxation of property owners. Further, the Law Department adopted a non-enforcement approach to
New York State morals legislation, relating to preserving the Sabbath, gambling, alcohol consumption, and prostitution. 1" This led to

14 Id. at 109-10 (footnote omitted).
" Id. at 111.
16 NELSON, supra note 1, at 113-14.
1" See id. at 120-23.
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'8
"the development of a cosmopolitan rather than Puritanical city."'

Tammany Hall controlled the City and the Law Department
from 1917-1933. Promotion on the basis of merit was the norm, with
lawyers being hired based upon their academic performance in law
school rather than their family backgrounds and graduation from elite
law schools. Unfortunately, corruption in City government, under
Mayor Jimmy Walker, spilled over into corruption in the Law Department. Professor Nelson described this as follows:
All we can know for sure about the Law Department
between 1918 and 1933 is that it was very much part
of the Tammany Hall machine and that it participated
in at least some and overlooked more of the corrupt
practices of that machine.
More significantly, the Law Department shared
Tammany's convictions about ethnicity and money.
Tammany's leaders did not regard men from aristocratic backgrounds or elite educational institutions as
their superiors .... Tammany used the Law Depart-

ment as a vehicle of upward mobility for young men,
and even young women, of ambition. And, in return
for opportunity, it made one major demand-loyalty. 9
A shift occurred in 1918 concerning morals legislation, in part
because of pressure from the Roman Catholic Church. Laws relating
to alcoholic beverages were not enforced, despite the 1919 ratification of the Prohibition Amendment to the United States Constitution. 20 But, sex was taken seriously by Tammany Hall and the Law
Department, which resulted in arrests and prosecutions of gay men
18 Id. at 123.
'9
20

Id. at 137-38.
U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII (repealed 1933).
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and prostitutes, establishment of a City censor for motion pictures,
and "a determined effort to close down 'indecent and immoral' plays
performed live on Broadway."21 Efforts also were made to enforce
observance of Sunday as the Sabbath, and there was a "crackdown on
gambling .

.

. to reduce the amount of money that organized crime

could siphon out of underclass communities."22
The new direction of the Law Department reflected the political objectives of Tammany Hall. This was described by Professor
Nelson as follows:
Tammany and the attorneys it appointed to the Law
Department fought for what its voters wantedinexpensive urban services, the defense of Roman
Catholic moral values, and the availability of innocent
pleasures that met with the Church's approval.
...

[T]he Corporation Counsels recognized that what

mattered is not whether they won the fights they
started, but that their choice of fights represented what
Tammany's constituents wanted. It did not actually
matter whether Tammany delivered services for the
underclasses as long as the underclasses remained
convinced that Tammany was fighting the good fight.
• . . Charles Murphy's Tammany Hall . . . may have

been one of the first political organizations to appreciate that, in a democracy dependent on mass voting,
fighting evil is more important to retaining power over
time than defeating evil.
However we evaluate Tammany's approach,
understanding it will place the machine's personnel
policies in the Law Department in a clearer light. Perhaps, attorneys who have honed their skills and out21 NELSON,

supra note 1, at 143 (quoting A.H. Wood Theatre Co. v. Gilchrist, 193 N.Y.S.

259, 260 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1922).
22 Id. at 145.
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performed their peers in highly ranked academic institutions will provide superior legal services and win
more cases than more ordinary lawyers....
But, if the goal is neither to win cases nor to
impress insiders with the quality of legal services-if
the goal is to fight the fights the people want foughtthen it is more important to employ attorneys who remain close to the people than attorneys with elite
backgrounds and fancy academic training ....
The coherence of Tammany Hall's conception
of law and of the role of Corporation Counsel and his
staff in the legal system warrants our appreciation. Its
conception was democratic and realist rather than aristocratic or formalist. Tammany saw law as a vehicle
of power, not as an instrument of right.
Fiorello LaGuardia was the Mayor of the City of New York
from 1934 until 1945.24 He led the City during recovery from the
Depression. He received substantial amounts of New Deal federal
money, and the Law Department played a major role in obtaining
federal funds and in insuring they were spent properly.25 LaGuardia's Corporation Counsel, Paul Windels, replaced most of the assistant corporation counsels and returned to the earlier practice of hiring
based upon academic credentials rather than political affiliation.26 He
hired nine female attorneys, including Jane Bolin, an African American woman who became "the nation's first African-American female
23 Id. at 150-52.

24 NYC.gov,

Elected

Mayors

of

New

York

City:

Fiorello

Henry

LaGuardia,

http://www.nyc.gov/html/nycl00/html/classroom/hist info/mayors.html (last visited Mar.
24, 2009) ("Fiorello LaGuardia, or 'Little Flower,' is widely regarded as one of the best
mayors in New York City history, whose tenure redefined the office.").
25 Id. (describing how former Mayor LaGuardia "worked closely with the New Deal administration of President Franklin Roosevelt to secure funding for large public works projects").
26 NELSON, supra note 1, at 161.
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However, the Law Department also was used in many ways

to advance the political objectives of Mayor LaGuardia.
Democratic mayors controlled the City and the Law Department for twenty years after LaGuardia left office, from 1946 through
1965.28 There were eight Corporation Counsels during this period of
time, "[n]one of [whom] had a profound impact on the Law Department.,

29

During this period, the assistant corporation counsels "per-

formed the City's legal work in a sound professional fashion and con30
tinued to provide the Law Department with intellectual leadership.,
Unfortunately, patronage appointments of lawyers to the Law Department led to some very good lawyers doing "nearly all the
work."

31

Also during this period of time, the Law Department vigorously supported efforts to remove Communists from City government
jobs. These efforts were strongly supported by the Roman Catholic
Church. Professor Nelson described this development as follows:
[T]he Law Department's anti-Communist effort was
more than one of the darkest moments in its history.
More significantly, anti-Communism marked the fullblown emergence in city politics of a sort of legal
demagoguery that remains familiar in American politics today.
...

Tammany's purge of Communists from city gov-

27 Id. at 164 (footnote omitted).

See Douglas Martin, Jane Bolin, the Country's First

Black Woman to Become a Judge, is Deadat 98, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 2007, at A2 1.
28 NELSON, supra note 1, at 183. From 1946 to 1965 William O'Dwyer, Vincent Impellit-

teri,
and Robert F. Wagner, Jr. were the Mayors of New York City. Id.
29 Id. at 183.
30 Id. at 189.
" Id. at 190.
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ernment marked one of the first sustained occasions in
American history on which political leaders relinquished control over a divisive issue and turned to
government lawyers to realize a cultural agenda.
Sadly the lawyers, in thrall to a majoritarian democratic ethos and hence oblivious of their obligation to
comply with laws adopted by government for the defense of all citizens, did the majority's bidding.32
The Mayor's office was under Democratic control and the Corporation Counsel and "declined to take a strong, imaginative stand in ad33
dressing issues of racial and religious discrimination.,
A very different role for the Corporation Counsel emerged
with the 1965 election of John Lindsay as Mayor of the City of New
York.

Lindsay's Corporation Counsels, J. Lee Rankin, Norman

Redlich, and Frederick Nathan, fully supported Lindsay's efforts to
serve the needs of African-American and Puerto Rican residents of
the City.34 They sought to eliminate police brutality against African-

Americans and Puerto Ricans, partly through attempts to establish a
Civilian Review Board.35

Additionally, the Corporation Counsels

wanted to improve the quality of public education by changing "the
governance structure of New York City's schools in order to give African Americans and Puerto Ricans greater voice in the education of
their children.,

36

During the Lindsay Administration, an honors program was

32 Id. at 196.

33 NELSON, supra note 1, at 216.

14 Id. at 232.
35 Id.
36 Id. at 235.
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established to recruit excellent recent law school graduates to the
Law Department. The purpose was to invigorate a legal staff dominated by civil service lawyers over whom the Corporation Counsel
had limited control. 37 The honors program survived into future administrations.38
The attack on institutionalized racism, the unsuccessful battle
to establish a meaningful civilian review board, and battles with unions over wage increases all occurred when the City faced a fiscal
crisis. 39 This led to an undermining of the independence of the Corporation Counsels-they were called upon to provide political support for the mayor. Professor Nelson described the Lindsay years of
the Law Department as follows:
Thus, Lindsay's lawyers were advocates for an
ideological agenda, not for the city as a whole. Their
advocacy reflected a new and noble conception of the
role of the Law Department as defender of equality
and individualism-a noble idea that attracted some
eager, able youths who have remained with the department and continued to render valuable service to
the city over time. Unfortunately, however, a majority
of New Yorkers were not committed either to truly
full equality or to genuinely individualistic values.
And, in the deeply democratic polity that New York
City was and is, that noble idea could not survive.4 °

7 Id. at 223.
38 NYC.gov, New York City Law Department-Summer Honors Program,
http://www.nyc.gov/html/law/html/careers/honors.shtml (last visited Apr. 20, 2009). The
summer honors program receives 3,000 applications each year from which approximately
fifty interns are selected.
39 NELSON, supra note 1, at 240. For an interesting take on Mayor Lindsay's term as
Mayor, see Robert D. McFadden, John V. Lindsay, Mayor and Maverick, Dies at 79, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 21, 2000, at Al.
40 NELSON, supranote 1, at 239-40.
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Others might express a more positive view and say this period of time
was the Law Department's finest hour, with its valiant, though unsuccessful, efforts to achieve the goal of racial justice.
Mayor Abraham Beame inherited the economic problems that
developed during the Lindsay Administration. The size of the Law
Department was reduced because of the fiscal crisis, and patronage
hiring replaced non-partisan merit hiring for those vacancies that did
occur. 4 1 Additionally, the Law Department's success in litigation de-

clined.42 The status of the department was described by Professor
Nelson as follows:
As Edward I. Koch was running for Mayor in
the autumn of 1977, the outlook both for the city and
for its office of [the] Corporation Counsel was bleak
indeed. By the mid-1970s there had been occasions
when neither city government nor the Law Department could perform its basic functions. A dramatic
turnabout was needed. John Lindsay had promised
one, but had failed to deliver it. As he took the oath of
office on January 1,431978, the question was--could Ed
Koch do any better?
Mayor Koch's first Corporation Counsel, his former law partner Allen Schwartz, inherited an understaffed Law Department with
low morale and generally poor performance. Schwartz ended patronage appointments and hired new lawyers based upon the excellence

41 Id. at 242.
42

Id. at 249.

43 Id. at 249-50.
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He moved the Law Department to a

different building and created office spaces equipped like those of
major law firms.45
In his first year, merit-based hiring yielded ninety-five new
lawyers, forty of whom were women. 46 He created three new divisions, one of which was the Economic Development Division that fo47
cused on the economic development of New York City.
The Law Department began to represent the City the way a
major law firm would represent a corporate client, with the economic
well being of the client being its primary concern. Social objectives
were not the focus of concern, and partisan politics were kept at a distance. Schwartz prevented most outside practice of law by Assistant
Corporation Counsels and initiated a pro bono program through
which lawyers from major law firms handled litigation for the City,
without a fee for services.
Allen Schwartz's successors, Fritz Schwarz and Peter Zimroth, continued the approach established by Schwartz of "zealously
representing its client, the city of New York, in the manner in which
48
a law firm represents a business entity.,
The success of the Law Department under Allen Schwartz's
leadership was described as follows by Professor Nelson:
Allen Schwartz's achievement, in turn, lay in
44 Id. at 256, 258.
4' NELSON, supra note
46 Id. at 262.

1,at 257.

47 Id. at 263. Schwartz also created the Fiscal and Securities Division to "advise[] city
officials ... with the issuance and sale of municipal bonds," and the Commercial Litigation
Division, which "took over much of the work of the old contracts division." Id.at 263-64.
41 Id. at 275.
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recognizing that the reconstitution of a department of
law made it possible to recreate a professional Law
Department. By obtaining necessary funds, acquiring
professional-quality space, reorganizing and closely
managing divisions, and hiring top-flight attorneys on
the basis of merit, Schwartz succeeded in transforming
the Law Department into a professional office that
represented its client as an entity and remained free
from political pressures intrinsic to democratic municipal government to favor particular factions within
the entity. 9
Mayor David Dinkins was elected mayor in 1989 and appointed Victor Kovner as his Corporation Counsel. Kovner was replaced less than two years later by Peter Sherwood, a former litigator
with the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People Legal Defense Fund. According to Professor Nelson, "[n]either
[Sherwood] nor Kovner made any significant changes in the staff of
the Law Department.,

50

Professor Nelson did not provide an in-depth discussion of the
Law Department under Mayors Giuliani and Bloomberg, but did note
that the structure established by Allen Schwartz has been retained. 5'
The book provides an excellent view of the history of New
York City through the lens of the work done by the principal lawyers
for the City that dates back to the City's inception in 1686. It is a
well written, well organized, and detailed account of 323 years of development of the Law Department. The scope of the book, from the
49 Id. at 284.
50 NELSON, supra note 1, at 302.
"' Id. at314.
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days of the Recorder in the colonial period to the work of the Law
Department under Mayors Koch, Giuliani, and Bloomberg, provides
a unique insight into the governing process of the City of New York,
from its beginning to the present day.
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